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Regulatory Silence at the FDA 
Jordan Paradise† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Congress creates federal administrative agencies, crafts 
their fundamental organizational structure and mission, and be-
stows upon them authority to perform tasks such as rulemaking, 
adjudication, investigation, and licensing. Often, Congress ex-
pressly directs an agency to perform a specific task within a 
timeframe subject to carefully enumerated factors or considera-
tions.1 Many times, however, an agency is left with a great deal 
of discretion, either express or implied, to determine appropriate 
action within the scope of its authority, the statutory language, 
the Constitution, and procedural laws.2 It is in these instances 
that the Supreme Court’s deference precedent has flourished, 
setting forth when a court ought to defer to an agency’s reason-
able interpretation of the statute that it administers when the 
 
†  Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, jpara-
dise@luc.edu. Copyright © 2018 by Jordan Paradise. 
 1. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355b(a) (2012). 
Not later than one year after January 4, 2002, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall promulgate a final rule requiring that the 
labeling of each drug for which an application is approved . . . include 
the toll-free number maintained by the Secretary for the purpose of 
receiving reports of adverse events regarding drugs and a statement 
that such number is to be used for reporting purposes only, not to re-
ceive medical advice. With respect to the final rule. 
  (1) The rule shall provide for the implementation of such labeling 
requirement in a manner that the Secretary considers to be most likely 
to reach the broadest consumer audience. 
  (2) In promulgating the rule, the Secretary shall seek to minimize 
the cost of the rule on the pharmacy profession. 
  (3) The rule shall take effect not later than 60 days after the date 
on which the rule is promulgated. 
Id. 
 2. Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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statute itself is silent or ambiguous.3 As muddled and disputed 
as this deference case law is, it seeks to clarify the scope of an 
agency’s discretion when the agency acts to interpret law. How-
ever, agencies, especially the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), also decide not to interpret language within a statute 
or regulation even though such interpretation is authorized by 
Congress and would facilitate effective and consistent industry 
responses.4 
Nowhere is this behavior more evident than in the FDA’s 
regulatory authority as it relates to patent law, where the stat-
ute authorizes the agency to act but does not require a specific 
regulatory action. This Article uses two recent examples of high-
stakes litigation in the life-sciences realm that demonstrate the 
FDA’s reluctance to wade into issues regarding patent-related 
procedural mechanisms within legislation. Both case studies in-
volve situations in which Congress directed the FDA to oversee 
a regulatory process and provided a statutory framework that 
involved the use of patent information as part of that process. 
The first deals with risk evaluation and mitigation strategies 
(REMS) in the context of drugs and biologics established in the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007.5 The 
second deals with the Biologics Price Competition and Innova-
tion Act (BPCIA) enacted as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2009.6 Although both examples raise sim-
ilar issues and have resulted in protracted litigation,7 to date 
 
 3. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 4. There is foundational case law distinguishing an agency’s failure to act 
and declining to act that is relevant here under an Administrative Procedure 
Act section 706 analysis. See generally Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 
U.S. 55 (2004) (holding that claims to compel action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act when agency action is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts the agency’s failure to take a 
discrete agency action that was required). 
 5. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-85 (2007) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 6. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C. & 21 U.S.C.). 
 7. See Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 582 U.S. __, Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195, slip. 
op. (June 12, 2017); Complaint, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., (D.N.J. 
Apr. 3, 2014) (No. 14-2094) (No. 1) (original complaint); Order, Mylan Pharms. 
Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094, (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2014) (No. 54) (order on 
motion to dismiss); Order, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 15-8017, 
(3rd Cir., Mar. 5, 2015) (No. 42) (order on motion to petition and cross petitions 
for permission to appeal); Order Granting Mylan’s Unopposed Motion to Seal, 
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only the REMS example has been addressed in the legal litera-
ture.8 
Part I of the Article discusses relevant administrative law 
and case precedent regarding required agency action and failure 
to act, including the scope of judicial review. This Part also ad-
dresses the role of citizen petitions in requesting an agency to 
act and the legal implications of an agency response or lack 
thereof. Part II examines the statutory framework for drugs and 
biological products, as well as the crucial relationship between 
the FDA and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) as it 
impacts drug and biologic development and approval. Part III 
delves into the two case studies, describing the relevant statu-
tory language and connecting the language to agency behavior. 
Part III.A details the REMS litigation and current status in the 
courts, as well as congressional response in the form of proposed 
legislation.9 Part III.B details the BPCIA ligation, which culmi-
nated in the June 2017 Supreme Court decision Sandoz v. 
Amgen, and highlights the ongoing legal challenges with the 
statutory provisions.10 Part IV discusses broader implications 
and suggests several meaningful ways in which the FDA could 
address the current uncertainty arising from these two exam-
ples. 
This Article contributes to the literature in three ways. 
First, it explores FDA behavior through the lens of administra-
tive law and practice, particularly tied to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and relevant case law. Second, it delves 
into two real-time instances in which the FDA’s silence has sig-
nificantly contributed to anticompetitive action from life-science 
companies that impacts consumers. Third, it urges that the FDA 
 
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094, (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (No. 
252). 
 8. Several legal scholars have examined the use of REMS by the pharma-
ceutical industry to thwart generic competition. See generally Michael A. Car-
rier & Brenna Sooy, Five Solutions to the REMS Patent Problem, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
1661 (2017) (concluding that patents on REMS programs undermine generic 
competition); Jordan Paradise, REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma 
Hijacking Drug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43 
(2015) (exploring the tactics used to stifle competition); Darren S. Tucker & 
Gregory F. Wells, Emerging Competition Issues Facing Follow-On Biologics, 29 
ANTITRUST MAGAZINE 100 (2014) (arguing that anticompetitive reactions to 
BPCIA will likely mirror historic ones to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 9. Creating and Restoring Equal Access To Equivalent Samples Act of 
2017, S. 974, 115th Cong. (2017) (attempting to promote competition in the mar-
ket for drugs and biologicals). 
 10. Sandoz, 582 U.S. __, Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195, slip. op. (June 12, 2017). 
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can play a more dominant role in interpreting the statutes going 
forward to provide clarity to industry and explores meaningful 
ways to achieve that goal. 
I.  DEFINING FDA ACTION   
Before exploring the two case studies, a brief discussion of 
the underlying administrative-law framework is warranted. The 
following Sections provide an overview of basic statutory defini-
tions, the scope of judicial review, instances of deference to ad-
ministrative agencies, and the citizen petition process. 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
Federal administrative agencies are constrained by a vari-
ety of sources, though chiefly through their enabling statute and 
subsequent related legislation, as well as the APA.11 The APA 
grounds many of its provisions on the concept of agency action, 
which it defines as “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, 
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or 
failure to act.”12 Agency actions, including failures to act, are 
subject to judicial review, the scope of which is set forth in the 
APA.13 An agency may act in a definitive manner, by promulgat-
ing a regulation or issuing an order through adjudication. An 
agency also acts when it formally denies a request. There may 
also be a failure to act, which occurs when an agency fails to take 
a discrete, identifiable action that the statute requires the 
agency to take.14 Finally, there may be agency inaction, which 
can take many forms. An agency inaction (the omission of an ac-
tion without formally rejecting a request) is not the same as a 
failure to act or a denial.15 The Court provides: 
 
 11. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 12. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
 13. Id. §§ 701–706. These provisions are applicable except to the extent that 
“(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law.” Id. § 701. “A person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof.” Id. § 702. 
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which 
there is no adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A prelim-
inary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewa-
ble is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.” Id. § 704. 
 14. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (“[A] claim 
under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed 
to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”).  
 15. Id. at 63. 
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A “failure to act” is not the same thing as a “denial.” The latter is the 
agency’s act of saying no to a request; the former is simply the omission 
of an action without formally rejecting a requestfor example, the fail-
ure to promulgate a rule or take some decision by a statutory dead-
line.16 
The distinction between a definitive action on the part of the 
agency, a failure to act, and inaction matters for purposes of ju-
dicial review. Agency actions, in whatever form, are typically re-
viewed by courts under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard, 
where the court is to hold unlawful and set aside the agency ac-
tion if it is found to be arbitrary and capricious.17 The arbitrary-
and-capricious test requires that agencies make decisions based 
on a consideration of the relevant factors including alternatives, 
without a clear error of judgment, and under the correct legal 
standard.18 While arbitrary-and-capricious inquiry is “searching 
and careful,” the standard of review “is a narrow one,” where the 
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.19 
However, where a party alleges that an agency has failed to 
act, the reviewing court is directed to “compel agency action un-
lawfully withheld.”20 Here, the APA empowers a court to compel 
an agency “to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act” or 
“to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall 
act.”21 However, this occurs only upon the court determining 
that there was a failure to actwhere the agency failed to take 
a discrete, identifiable action that the statute requires.22 For ex-
ample, “when an agency is compelled by law to act within a cer-
tain time period, but the manner of its action is left to the 
agency’s discretion, a court can compel the agency to act, but has 
no power to specify what the action must be.”23 
There is a general presumption of reviewability for agency 
actions, yet the APA provides two circumstances in which there 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. The APA provides six standards of judicial review. Courts review most 
policy decisions of agencies under the arbitrary and capricious test, which ap-
plies to informal agency action and informal rulemaking, unless Congress spec-
ifies otherwise. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 339 
(6th ed. 2012). 
 18. Id. at 339–40. 
 19. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
 21. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 108 (1947)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 65. 
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is no judicial review available: (1) where a statute precludes ju-
dicial review,24 or (2) when there is an “agency action committed 
to agency discretion by law.”25 The phrase “discretion by law” is 
a narrow exception, where “statutes are drawn in such broad 
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.”26 This excep-
tion is where agency inaction traditionally falls. In Heckler v. 
Chaney, the Supreme Court applied the nonreviewability section 
of the APA to eliminate from judicial review administrative-
agency actions classified as refusals to take action, or agency in-
action.27 The Court held that the FDA’s decision “not to take en-
forcement action should be presumed immune from judicial re-
view.”28 In its reasoning, the Court stated “when an agency 
refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power 
over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not 
infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to pro-
tect.”29 After the decision in Heckler, legal scholars began to 
shape the meaning of the agency inaction. Cass Sunstein wrote 
that agency actions are “‘committed to agency discretion by law’ 
whenever the governing statute imposes no legal constraints on 
the agency with respect to the particular allegation made by the 
plaintiff.”30 Justice Antonin Scalia penned that inaction is where 
an agency “simply sits on its hands and does not choose to do 
additional things that could be done.”31 
The case law regarding agency decisions not to initiate no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking is a little more opaque than en-
forcement discretion. Agencies may refuse to promulgate a rule 
after receiving input from the public or industry by means of cit-
izen petitions. However, that refusal, or decision not to act, may 
come in many forms. The Supreme Court has not examined the 
issue and two dated cases in the D.C. Circuit involving similar 
 
 24. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
 25. Id. § 701(a)(2). 
 26. Citizens to Pres. Overland Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (cit-
ing S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 212 (1945)). 
 27. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Cass Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 659 (1985). 
 31. Antonin Scalia, The Role of The Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 191, 191 (1986). 
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facts reached two different outcomes based on the facts.32 How-
ever, both were decided prior to Heckler v. Chaney.33 In Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, the court held that the 
refusal to promulgate a rule was arbitrary and capricious.34 
There, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) waited 
seven years to deny the petition, which included extensive infor-
mation gathering proceedings and a detailed, written decision.35 
This seems as if the agency did in fact act, but later ceased ac-
tion. In WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, decided two years later, another 
panel of the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Communication 
Commission’s (FCC’s) refusal to initiate rulemaking was review-
able for the question of whether the agency abused that discre-
tion not to initiate a rulemaking.36 There, the FCC did not even 
begin the investigatory and information gathering process as the 
SEC had done in the prior case. This outcome seems to be in con-
flict with Heckler v. Chaney, in that agency discretion in the rule-
making context is subject to review, while there is a presumption 
that agency discretion in the enforcement context is not subject 
to review. 
Some recent scholarship tackles the realm of agency inac-
tion and its various forms and this Article will not attempt to 
recreate that literature,37 although a few excerpts are useful. For 
example, Professor Sharon Jacobs terms this inaction “adminis-
trative restraint” and offers a taxonomy framing how agencies 
use restraint strategically in order to “avoid unnecessary conflict 
 
 32. See WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 33. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 821. 
 34. Natural Res. Def. Council, 606 F.2d at 1031.  
 35. Id. at 1035–36. 
 36. 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 37. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVT’L L.J. 461, 462 (2008); 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657 (2004) (advocating for judicial review of 
agency inaction and that both agency action and inaction should be subjected to 
the same principles of judicial review); Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative 
State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 565 (2014); Michael A. Livermore 
& Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 
101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013) (proposing “a specific mechanism for [the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs] to engage in review of agency inaction by 
examining petitions for rulemakings filed with agencies”); Daniel P. Selmi, Ju-
risdiction to Review Agency Inaction Under Federal Environmental Law, 
72 IND. L.J. 65 (1996) (examining the jurisdictional parameters of judicial re-
view of agency inaction in federal environmental law and the adverse effects of 
confusion over these jurisdictional boundaries); Scalia, supra note 31, at 194–
95; Sunstein, supra note 30, at 653–54. 
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with other institutional actors.”38 Professor Jacobs refutes the 
position that “agencies engage in inaction and delay primarily 
for nefarious reasons, including lassitude and narrow interest 
group influence.”39 She argues rather that agencies “must be 
pragmatic and strategic in the exercise of their authority.”40 She 
urges that courts should not undermine agency passivity where 
appropriate internal safeguards exist, as there is merit to agency 
decisions not to act, even in the face of apparent authority to do 
so.41 
Professor Jacobs specifically addresses “decisions not to de-
cide,” where agencies avoid difficult questions entirely rather 
than taking steps, even minimal steps, to resolve them.42 The 
chief example of this approach was reflected in the activity of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) leading up to the Su-
preme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.43 There, the EPA 
determined that the statute imposed no duty to exercise its judg-
ment to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions and that doing so 
would not be in the interest of the Agency.44 The Court found an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Agency in declining to make 
a judgment on the public health and welfare effects of green-
house-gas emissions from motor vehicles as air pollutants.45 
Others have explored judicial review of administrative action 
and inaction, positing that the outcomes are “doctrinally inco-
herent and unclear.”46 
B. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION 
Courts will also defer to agency actions in certain circum-
stances. After Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., one circumstance achieving judicial deference is 
where the statute that the agency administers is silent or am-
biguous on a particular issue.47 The inquiry for the court is 
 
 38. Jacobs, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. at 588. 
 40. Id. at 568. 
 41. Jacobs says “[d]eferring decisions or taking small steps rather than ag-
gressive ones can be useful where more decisive action would expose the agency 
to damaging backlash.” Id. 
 42. Id. at 575. 
 43. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 44. Id. at 511. 
 45. Id. at 534. 
 46. Biber, supra note 37, at 461. 
 47. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843–44 (1984). 
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whether Congress has spoken directly on the precise question at 
issue.48 Where the statute is silent or ambiguous, courts are to 
defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.49 
The Supreme Court provides: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific pro-
vision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or man-
ifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to 
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In 
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statu-
tory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administra-
tor of an agency.50 
In Chevron, the Clean Air Act required that nonattainment 
states—those considered to have air quality that is worse than 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards—establish a per-
mit program regulating “new or modified major stationary 
sources” of air pollution.51 The EPA had promulgated a regula-
tion to implement this mandate allowing a state to adopt a plant-
wide definition of the term “[s]tationary source.”52 This effec-
tively controlled the total volume of pollutants emitted by a fa-
cility rather than individual points of emission. The EPA’s vision 
to accomplish this was called the bubble concept, in which the 
facility is encased in a single bubble for purposes of measuring 
emissions from stationary sources.53 Environmentalists immedi-
ately challenged the regulation. 
The challenges ultimately reached the Supreme Court. 
There, the Court stated that “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted 
 
 48. Id. at 842. 
 49. Id. at 844. 
 50. Id. at 843–44. 
 51. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 distinguished between nonat-
tainment regions and prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) regions with 
regard to obtaining permits for building any new or modified “stationary source” 
of air pollution. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 
§ 129(a)(2)(B)(i), 91 Stat. 685 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4701–4772 (1976)). Appli-
cants for a new source permit in nonattainment states had to satisfy the “lowest 
achievable emission rate” regardless of cost. Id. § 129(a)(2)(B)(i)(3). On the other 
hand, PSD applicants had to show they were using the “best available control 
technology,” taking into account the cost of installing and using such technol-
ogy. Id. § 165(a)(4). 
 52. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i) (1985). 
 53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855–56. 
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with two questions.”54 The first is “whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.”55 If the intent of 
Congress is clear, the court and the agency must give effect to 
the expressed intent of Congress.56 If the statute is silent or am-
biguous, the second question for the court is “whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible,” or reasonable, “con-
struction of the statute.”57 Based on this analysis, the Supreme 
Court held “that Congress did not have a specific intention on 
the applicability of the bubble concept . . . and conclude[d] that 
the EPA’s use of that concept . . . [was] a reasonable policy choice 
for the agency to make.”58 The Court looked to the overall con-
gressional aim of the permit program as accommodating conflict 
between “economic interest in permitting capital improvements 
to continue and the environmental interest in improving air 
quality.”59 The Court found the agency interpretation was a rea-
sonable accommodation of competing interests and was entitled 
to deference.60 They further noted that the regulatory scheme 
was technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in 
a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involved rec-
onciling conflicting policies.61 
Other cases have examined deference in different contexts, 
such as when an agency interprets its own regulation62 or when 
the interpretation is contained in an informal document gener-
ated outside of a rulemaking or adjudication.63 These cases are 
rife with controversy due to inconsistent application at the lower 
courts and have garnered considerable attention in Supreme 
Court concurrences and dissents. There is a vast literature prob-
ing this case law. 
 
 54. Id. at 842. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 843. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 845. 
 59. Id. at 851. 
 60. Id. at 865. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 63. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (describing a case 
where a U.S. Custom Service tariff schedule imposed a tariff on day planners 
previously classified as duty-free); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) 
(describing a case where the Administrator used an interpretative bulletin to 
define working time). 
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C. CITIZEN PETITIONS TO CHALLENGE AGENCY ACTION 
The United States Constitution protects the right of citizens 
to petition the government to request an action on a specific mat-
ter.64 This right has been applied to federal agencies. Likewise, 
the APA requires federal administrative agencies to allow the 
public to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule.65 Finally, the FDA explicitly allows citizen petitions and 
has detailed regulations identifying the scope and process.66 Any 
“interested person” can file a citizen petition and request that 
the FDA “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order,” or “take 
or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action.”67 
All citizen petitions must include the “[a]ction [r]equested,”68 
and a “[s]tatement of [g]rounds,” including “the factual and legal 
grounds on which the petitioner relies.”69 
There is a broad range of grounds on which citizens submit 
petitions to the FDA. Often an entity will petition the Agency to 
promulgate a regulation, which it then typically denies formally 
in some type of written form. This denial of the citizen petition’s 
request, the refusal to promulgate a regulation, or some other 
decision, is itself an agency action under the APA and may be 
challenged in court. The citizen-petition process serves to supply 
standing to an individual challenging the Agency’s action in 
court. However, if the Agency neglects to respond with an official 
denial or related action, this is an instance of an agency inaction. 
A recent empirical study examined all citizen petitions submit-
ted to the FDA between 2001 and 2010 and found that the 
Agency denied eighty-one percent of the petitions and granted 
nineteen percent.70 The study also found that after legislation 
was passed in 2007 requiring FDA to act within 180 days on each 
petition, the number of citizen petition filings rose from twenty-
seven to thirty-four per year.71 
 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (“Each agency shall give an interested person 
the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). 
 66. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(a) (2017). 
 67. Id. § 10.25. 
 68. Id. § 10.30(b)(A). 
 69. Id. § 10.30(b)(B). For any petition, the Commission may also require an 
environmental impact statement and economic impact statement. Id. 
§ 10.30(b)(C),(D). 
 70. Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical 
Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 249 (2012). 
 71. Id.  
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II.  THE FDA’S STATUTORY SCOPE: DRUGS & BIOLOGICS   
The FDA is a classic command-and-control regulatory 
agency with the ability to promulgate regulations as a core au-
thority granted to it by Congress. A monstrous statute, the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), directs oversight of 
human and animal drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, food (in-
cluding dietary supplements), tobacco products, and products 
emitting radiation.72 A separate statute, the Public Health Ser-
vice Act (PHSA), contains provisions for the FDA’s regulation of 
biological products.73 In all, the FDA oversees upwards of 
twenty-five percent of consumer products in the United States.74 
Congress frequently amends the FDCA and PHSA, with the 
most recent significant amendments contained in the 21st Cen-
tury Cures Act, enacted in December 2016.75 
The overall mission of the FDA, as supplied by Congress, is 
seemingly in conflict, requiring both speed in product approvals 
and ample protection of the public. Many commentators have la-
mented this inherent tension.76 The Agency is tasked with “pro-
mot[ing] the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing 
clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing 
of regulated products in a timely manner” and at the same time 
“protect[ing] the public health by ensuring that [among other 
things] . . . human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective.”77 
The Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, Janet Woodcock, writing with a coauthor on the need for 
ongoing collaboration to improve outcomes, notes “[t]he ongoing 
tension between these two objectives results in assertions that 
FDA requirements are stifling innovation, and simultaneously 
that FDA standards are too low.”78 The split mission may also 
 
 72. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 1–1012, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–399d (2012). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–263 (2012). 
 74. FDA, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 2, https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/ 
20170405003627/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ 
ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM298578.pdf. 
 75. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
 76. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug 
Development Process: Results from a Survey of Industry and the FDA, 6 INNO-
VATION POL’Y & ECON. 91, 91 (2006); Janet Woodcock & Raymond Woosley, The 
FDA Critical Path Initiative and Its Influence on New Drug Development, 
59 ANN. REV. MED. 1, 2 (2008). 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1), (2)(B). 
 78. See Woodcock & Woosley, supra note 76. 
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contribute to FDA policy choices, including decisions not to act 
in a particular situation. 
The FDCA features ten chapters devoted to the various 
products that the FDA oversees. The PHSA, on the other hand, 
contains two lengthy sections regarding regulation of biological 
products.79 The new drug and biological-product approval pro-
cesses share similar features, owing largely to efforts from both 
Congress and the Agency to streamline the requirements. Each 
is subject to three phases of clinical trials, laboratory and man-
ufacturing controls, human-subject protections, adverse-event 
disclosure, reporting and tracking, labeling requirements, post-
market measures, and rigorous review and approval proce-
dures.80 The FDA has much discretion to require information as 
part of the premarket approval process for drugs and biological 
products, and to interpret the statutes. The FDA has promul-
gated a vast landscape of regulations regarding all aspects of the 
drug and biological product lifecycle. 
The FDA statutory and regulatory regime necessarily impli-
cates the concurrent authority of the PTO. The PTO awards pa-
tents for inventions; the pharmaceutical industry rakes in a sub-
stantial amount of patent protection as an investment-recouping 
strategy to offset costly product development.81 Patents must 
demonstrate novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and enablement, 
and must meet threshold patentability requirements.82 Drug 
and biological product patents typically involve the chemical or 
biologic compound itself, manufacturing practices, and methods 
of use.83 In addition to patent protections and exclusivity 
through the PTO, Congress also provides product exclusivity 
through the FDA in the form of market and data exclusivities for 
particular types of products.84 For example, new chemical enti-
ties receive five years of exclusivity, innovator biologics receive 
 
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–263 (2012). 
 80. Jordan Paradise, The Legal and Regulatory Status of Biosimilars: How 
Product Naming and State Substitution Laws May Impact the United States 
Healthcare System, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 49, 64 (2015).  
 81. The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development estimates that the 
cost to develop a new prescription drug is nearly $2.6 billion. Joseph A. DiMasi 
et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 
47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016). 
 82. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012). Products of nature, natural phenom-
enon, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter. See Ass’n for Molec-
ular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2012). 
 83. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (declaring inventions are patentable). 
 84. For a discussion of FDA exclusivities, see generally Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
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twelve years of exclusivity, and certain generic drugs may re-
ceive 180 days of exclusivity after successful litigation against 
the innovator product.85 
Both new drugs and biological products must also adhere to 
statutory requirements for patent disclosure and communication 
processes for industry dealings as a component of product review 
and approval. However, Congress has established different 
means to effectuate these dealings, one set forth in the FDCA, 
the other in the BPCIA. The provisions in the FDCA applying to 
new-drug applications (NDAs)86 and abbreviated new-drug ap-
plications (ANDAs, otherwise known as generic drug applica-
tions)87 require innovator drug products to submit a list of their 
patents and expiration dates for the chemical compound and re-
lated methods of use to the FDA.88 The FDA maintains a public 
list in the Orange Book, which is consulted by the generic indus-
try to identify both the relevant patents and drug compound 
therapeutic-equivalence ratings for innovator products.89 The 
FDA disclaims any duty to independently confirm the validity 
and accuracy of these submitted patents.90 
A generic sponsor has four options when filing a generic-
drug application to address the existing patents held by the in-
novator. The generic sponsor (1) may certify to the FDA that 
 
L. REV. 345 (2007). The twelve-year exclusivity for innovator biological products 
was introduced in 2010, three years after the article cited. 
 85. For a discussion of the different types of FDA exclusivities, including 
biologic exclusivity, see Yaniv Heled, Patents Vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Bio-
logical Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 419, 427–32, 443–74 (2012). 
 86. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(b)–(e), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)–(e) (2012). 
 87. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(j), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j) (2012). 
 88. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(1) (2012). 
 89. Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob (last visited 
June 18, 2018). The therapeutic equivalence ratings dictate which chemical 
compounds the generic sponsor must compare their compound with in the re-
quired bioequivalence studies to support product approval. 
 90. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA 
and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act To Avoid Dealing with 
Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 211 (2015); see also Caraco 
Pharms. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405–06 (2012) (“[T]he 
FDA does not attempt to verify the accuracy of the use codes that brand manu-
facturers supply. It simply publishes the codes, along with the corresponding 
patent numbers and expiration dates, in a fat, brightly hued volume called the 
Orange Book . . .”). 
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there are no listed innovator patents in the Orange Book; (2) they 
may certify they will not enter the market until all relevant pa-
tents have expired; (3) they may certify that all relevant patents 
have expired; or (4) they may decide to file what is called a par-
agraph IV certification, claiming that although there are exist-
ing patents listed in the Orange Book, they are either invalid or 
unenforceable.91 This fourth type of certification is litigation-
forcing, in that it triggers a timeframe during which the innova-
tor product may bring an action for patent infringement against 
the generic sponsor.92 It is an act of artificial infringement cre-
ated by the statute, as the generic product has not yet been ap-
proved or entered the market. The goal is to ascertain the valid-
ity of the patent; a successful paragraph IV challenger is 
awarded 180 days of exclusivity.93 
The biologic and biosimilar product provisions are contained 
in the PHSA, recently amended by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, that establishes the biosimilar pathway to 
market.94 These provisions for biological products differ signifi-
cantly from the requirements for innovator and generic drug 
sponsors discussed above, largely attributable to the existing 
statutory frameworks and the complexity of biological products. 
The patent disclosure and industry processes are distinct for bi-
ological products. There is no requirement to submit patents and 
expiration dates to the FDA for public listing and the patent pro-
cess is a private back-and-forth between the innovator biologic 
and the biosimilar sponsor. 
The next Part will examine specific aspects of each of these 
FDA statutory frameworks that implicate patents, using two 
case studies. 
III.  AGENCY SUBTERFUGE OR REASONED RESTRAINT?   
The following two case studies highlight inaction on the part 
of the FDA at various stages of the regulatory process. The first 
involves recent statutory provisions establishing REMS require-
ments for drugs and biological products. The second involves the 
 
 91. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(b)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–
(IV), 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 92. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 
 93. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(j)(5)(B)(iv), 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 94. See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010); see also Paradise, su-
pra note 80, at 50. 
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legislative changes that created the abbreviated pathway to 
market for biosimilar biologics, including patent exchanges be-
tween innovator and biosimilar sponsors. 
A. RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 
The pharmaceutical industry is well known for its arsenal 
of anticompetitive tactics, including entering into reverse pay-
ments (also known as pay-for-delay settlements, in reference to 
the innovator paying the generic product to stay off the market 
during the 180 days of exclusivity);95 product hopping or ever-
greening (shifting market demand to a new formulation of a 
drug);96 using authorized generics to retain market share;97 and 
filing frivolous citizen petitions in order to delay generic market 
entry.98 As watchdog to anticompetitive behavior, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) routinely asserts antitrust laws 
against the pharmaceutical industry. The 2012 case Federal 
Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is one chief example, where 
the Supreme Court scrutinized a pay-for-delay settlement en-
tered into between an innovator-drug patent holder and a ge-
neric, holding that such agreements were not per se illegal but 
instead subject to a rule of reason test.99 
Drug and biologic innovators are now utilizing REMS to in-
terfere with generic drug entry. Amendments to the FDCA in 
2007 introduced new statutory REMS provisions that bolster the 
FDA’s post-approval authority.100 The FDA can require REMS 
either as a condition of approval101 or, in the case of already ap-
proved products, as a subsequent condition for continued mar-
keting.102 The FDA may require a medication guide for patients; 
additional physician prescribing information; communications 
 
 95. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013); 
Pay for Delay, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers 
-competition/pay-delay (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 96. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A 
New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 171 (2016); M. Sean Royall et 
al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” ANTITRUST, Fall 
2013, at 71, 71. 
 97. See FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND 
LONG-TERM IMPACT 66–69 (2011). 
 98. See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” 
Citizen Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 124–27 (2013). 
 99. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 100. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 505(p), 505-1, 
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(p), 355-1 (2012). 
 101. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505-1(a)(1). 
 102. See id. § 505-1(a)(2). 
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to healthcare providers and pharmacies; limitations on labeling, 
promotion, and prescribing to assure safe use by patients; pa-
tient registries and tracking; and a REMS implementation 
plan.103 Violations trigger civil money penalties and subject 
manufacturers to litigation under misbranding provisions 
within the FDCA.104 To date, the FDA has implemented over 
seventy REMS, more than half of which include elements to as-
sure safe use (ETASU) that often take the form of distribution 
restrictions; training and recordkeeping requirements for pre-
scribers and pharmacists; and prescribing and administration 
limitations.105 
REMS are being used in two distinct ways by innovators. 
First, innovators are patenting their ETASU and asserting pa-
tent infringement against generic or biosimilar versions of their 
product where the manufacturer attempts to utilize aspects of 
the patented ETASU in their own label.106 One example of this 
is Celgene’s patented distribution system for thalidomide, de-
scribed in the patent abstract as “[m]ethods for delivering a drug 
to a patients [sic] in need of the drug, while restricting access to 
the drug by patients for whom the drug may be contraindi-
cated.”107 
This assertion of patent rights poses a major problem for ge-
nerics. To obtain FDA approval through the ANDA process, ge-
neric applicants, among other things, must demonstrate bioe-
quivalence to the innovator products through pharmacodynamic 
and pharmacokinetic comparison studies and also must have the 
same proposed label.108 If the generic cannot acquire permission 
to use the same label, including the ETASU that are considered 
part of the labeling, and the FDA does not grant a waiver from a 
 
 103. See id. § 505-1. 
 104. Id. § 303(f )(4)(A). 
 105. See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm?event=RemsData 
.page (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 106. For a detailed discussion of the REMS provisions and the associated 
patent problems, see Paradise, supra note 8. 
 107. U.S. Patent No. 7,141,018 B2 (filed Nov. 28, 2006). 
 108. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(j)(A)(v). The stat-
ute requires many elements as part of the ANDA, including a demonstration of 
the same conditions of use, route of administration, dosage form, and strength. 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505(j)(A). 
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shared REMS system,109 then marketing and selling that ge-
neric drug would violate the law.110 
The statute emphasizes the preference of innovator and ge-
neric companies agreeing to implement a single, shared REMS 
system rather than separate systems each for the branded drug 
and the generic. However, this is proving difficult as innovator 
companies strategically refuse to negotiate or stall negotiations 
on development of a single, shared system.111 In the face of in-
dustry uncertainty, the FDA has denied several citizen petitions 
requesting them to act to interpret the statute regarding the fa-
cilitation of a single, shared REMS system.112 The FDA did re-
cently publish a draft guidance establishing a two-prong ap-
proach to address issues raised by the statute and industry 
behaviors.113 However, this guidance does not address situations 
in which the innovator threatens patent infringement or denies 
a license to use the ETASU. 
Second, innovators subject to REMS for an NDA drug prod-
uct claim that they cannot make samples of that drug available 
to the generic applicant because they would be in violation of 
distribution restrictions placed on the products by the FDA 
through ETASU REMS. One such case involves Celgene Corpo-
ration and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, where Mylan alleges that 
 
 109. The FDA maintains the authority to waive the use of a single, shared 
REMS system, though to date it is unclear how often they have done this, what 
products were involved, and whether there was a failure to negotiate due to 
innovator refusal. Such a waiver is possible where a relevant part of the inno-
vator reference listed drug (RLD) REMS is the subject of a patent and the ge-
neric was not able to obtain a license. The generic sponsor must certify to the 
FDA that they attempted to obtain a license and were refused. Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505-1(i)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B). The 
FDA recently published a draft guidance establishing a two-prong approach to 
address issues raised by the statute and industry behaviors. Use of a Drug Mas-
ter File for Shared System Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy Submis-
sions; Draft Guidance for Industry; Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 52,058 (2017) 
[hereinafter Use of a Drug Master File]. 
 110. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 21 U.S.C. § 352(y).  
 111. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Com-
missioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Steps to Improve FDA Review of Shared 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies to Improve Generic Drug Access, 
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/ucm584259.htm. 
 112. Kurt R. Karst, FDA Largely Denies Citizen Petition on Single, Shared 
REMS System, but Outlines Agency Standards and Processes, FDA LAW BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2013/10/fda-largely-denies-citizen 
-petition-on-single-shared-rems-system-but-outlines-agency-standards-and-p. 
 113. Use of a Drug Master File, supra note 109. 
 2018] REGULATORY SILENCE AT THE FDA 2401 
 
Celgene is refusing to distribute Thalomid and Revlimid for bio-
equivalence testing.114 The FDA has invoked ETASU REMS for 
both innovator products because of their teratogenic nature, in-
cluding requirements to prevent embryo-fetal exposure.115 The 
ETASU involve extensive requirements for distribution only 
through authorized dispensing pharmacies. Celgene asserts that 
the distribution imposed by the FDA prohibits the transfer of 
drug samples to Mylan for any purpose, including studies to 
demonstrate bioequivalence to the innovator product.116 At least 
two previous generic companies have alleged similar claims, alt-
hough those situations have resulted in settlements.117 
The FTC filed a June 2014 amicus brief in the case, arguing 
that Celgene is engaging in exclusionary conduct in violation of 
the Sherman Act by “refusing to sell to rivals.”118 The FTC iden-
tified potential violations of the Sherman Act by Celgene not 
only refusing to directly provide samples to Mylan, but also im-
plementing restrictions that prevent Mylan from purchasing 
samples though customary distribution channels.119 The U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Celgene’s 
motion to dismiss.120 Celgene has appealed. 
The statute does not specifically prohibit the exact behavior 
at issue in the case but provides generally: 
No holder of an approved covered application shall use any element to 
assure safe use required by the Secretary under this subsection to block 
or delay approval of an application under section 355(b) or (j) of this 
 
 114. Complaint, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 3, 2014). 
 115. Revlimid (lenalidomide) Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategy (REMS) 
Modification, FDA (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ 
UCM222644.pdf; Thalomid (thalidomide) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategy (REMS) Modification, FDA (Sept. 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatients 
andProviders/UCM222649.pdf. 
 116. Complaint at 28, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 
2014) (No. 14-2094) (No. 1). 
 117. Actelion Pharm., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 12-5743, 2013 WL 5524078 
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2013); Lannett Corp., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 
WL 1193912 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011). 
 118. Brief for Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. 
Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 (D.N.J. June 17, 2014). 
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Order on Motion to Dismiss, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., 
No. 14-2094, (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2014). The Third Circuit rejected Celgene’s re-
quest for immediate review in March 2015. Vin Gurrieri, 3rd Circ. Declines to 
Hear Mylan, Celgene Antitrust Fight, LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www 
.law360.com/articles/628588. 
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title or to prevent application of such element. . . to a drug that is the 
subject of an abbreviated new drug application.121 
The statute does not instruct on how this provision relates to the 
bioequivalence requirements generally. Nor does it contain any 
civil money penalties for violation of this provision or a private 
cause of action. The FDA has informed generic companies that 
they would exercise enforcement discretion and specifically told 
Mylan that they “would not consider the provision of samples of 
an RLD [reference listed drug] to a generic manufacturer a 
REMS violation.”122 
The FDA held a public meeting in July 2017, seeking input 
on the performance of the generic drug program and its goals of 
achieving a balance between access and innovation.123 Included 
in the Federal Register notice announcing the meeting were top-
ics specific to anticompetitive behavior enabled by the REMS 
provisions.124 Specifically, the FDA solicited comments on how 
the Agency should utilize its authority to address challenges en-
countered by generic companies attempting to reach agreements 
for shared REMS systems; what actions the FDA should take to 
address difficulties acquiring sufficient samples for testing; and 
what marketplace dynamics exist that may be disincentivizing 
the marketing of generics.125 Meeting materials, recordings, and 
presentations from the public meeting are available at the FDA’s 
website.126 Coverage and commentary resulting from the public 
meeting are ongoing in the legal media realm and blogosphere 
as the FDA continues to contemplate how to implement any 
changes to policy. 
In November 2017, FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb issued 
a statement announcing FDA’s new approach to improve the re-
view of shared REMS programs, noting the “need to make sure 
that REMS programs maintain their role in serving public 
health and don’t become a tool companies can use to delay or 
 
 121. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f )(8) 
(2012). 
 122. Complaint, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094, at 12 
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014). 
 123. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation and Access; Public Meeting; 
Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 22, 2017). 
 124. Id. at 28,495. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments; Ensuring a Balance 
Between Access and Innovation; Public Meeting, FDA (last updated Sept. 18, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm563986.htm. 
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block competition from generic products entering the market.”127 
As part of the new approach, Gottlieb assures the FDA “will ex-
plore new steps . . . to reduce the likelihood that branded drug 
companies can use the existence of REMS as a way to slow the 
entry of generic competition.”128 Gottlieb has also stated that 
Agency letters to brand companies that convey that selling sam-
ples to a generic company for testing is acceptable under a REMS 
may be made public.129 
Congress is also contemplating mechanisms to remedy the 
rampant problems with innovator bad actors in the REMS 
realm. Notably, an early draft of 2012 legislation had contained 
a provision to curb REMS abuses, but was removed following 
lobbying activity.130 The Creating and Restoring Equal Access to 
Equivalent Samples Act (CREATES Act), introduced in the Sen-
ate in April 2017 by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, would 
create a cause of action for generic and biosimilar sponsors to 
obtain restricted product samples.131 Two of the bill’s enumer-
ated findings explicitly address the scope of FDA authority as 
motivation for the bill: 
The [FDA] has testified that some manufacturers of covered products 
have used REMS and distribution restrictions adopted by the manu-
facturer on their own behalf as reasons to not sell quantities of a cov-
ered product to generic product developers, causing barriers and delays 
in getting generic products on the market. The [FDA] has reported re-
ceiving significant numbers of inquiries from generic product develop-
ers who were unable to obtain samples of covered products to conduct 
necessary testing and otherwise meet requirements for approval of ge-
neric drugs.132 
  The antitrust laws may address actions by license holders who im-
pede the prompt negotiation and development of a single, shared sys-
tem of elements to assure safe use, and the [FDA] has some authority 
to waive the requirement of a single, shared system. Clearer regulatory 
authority to approve different systems that meet the statutory require-
ments to ensure patient safety, however, would limit the effectiveness 
of bad faith negotiations over single, shared systems to delay generic 
 
 127. Press Release, supra note 111. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Derrick Gingery, FDA Exploring Whether Public Sharing Can Stop 
REMS Abuses, PINK SHEET (July 18, 2017), https://pink.pharmaintelligence 
.informa.com/PS121134/FDA-Exploring-Whether-Public-Shaming-Can-Stop 
-REMS-Abuses. This move would increase transparency and remove a com-
pany’s ability to blame the FDA for restricting access. Id. Agency review to de-
termine whether such a letter is warranted typically takes eighteen months. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. S. 974, 115th Cong. § 3(b) (2017). 
 132. Id. at § 2(6). 
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approval. At the same time, clearer regulatory authority would ensure 
all systems protect patient safety.133 
The bill would require that innovator products provide suf-
ficient quantities of the product to generic drug or biosimilar ap-
plicant (termed “eligible product developer”) in order to conduct 
clinical testing to support their application to the FDA.134 The 
term sufficient quantities is defined as an amount that would 
allow the product sponsor to conduct testing to support an ab-
breviated application for either a drug or biological product and 
“fulfill any regulatory requirements relating to such an applica-
tion for approval or licensing.”135 Where an innovator refuses to 
provide sufficient quantities following a request and offer to pur-
chase from the eligible product developer, the eligible product 
developer may then bring a civil action for failure to supply on 
“commercially reasonable, market-based terms.”136 Where the 
innovator product is the subject of a REMS with ETASU, there 
is also an authorization process through the FDA to achieve ac-
cess.137 There are affirmative defenses identified,138 along with 
remedies where the eligible product developer prevails, includ-
ing an order to provide access to sufficient quantities, reasonable 
attorney’s fees, and additional monetary amounts for delay or 
failure to comply.139 A similar bill was introduced in the 
House.140 
Effectively, this bill aims to fix the problem inherent in the 
more general current language of the statute imploring that “no 
holder or an approved covered application shall use any 
[ETASU] . . . to block or delay approval” of a generic drug or bio-
similar product.141 It would create a cause of action, provide rem-
edies, and compel compliance. However, while the new language 
provides some direction, there is still ample authority and dis-
cretion to the FDA on how to carry out the statute. For example, 
 
 133. Id. at § 2(10). 
 134. Id. at § 3(b)(1). 
 135. Id. at § 3(a)(9). 
 136. Id. at § 3(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
 137. Id. at § 3(b)(2)(B). The bill authorizes the Secretary of Health & Human 
Services to perform this, though this would be delegated to the Commissioner 
of the FDA. 
 138. Id. at § 3(b)(3). 
 139. Id. at § 4(A). 
 140. Fair Access for Safe and Timely (FAST) Generics Act, H.R. 2051, 115th 
Cong. (Apr. 6, 2017). 
 141. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f )(8) 
(2012). 
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the eligible product developer is authorized to submit to the Sec-
retary of Health & Human Services a written request to obtain 
sufficient quantities, and the Secretary is given 90 days to au-
thorize the ability of the eligible product developer to obtain a 
specific quantity for testing and bioequivalence purposes. It is 
unclear how this will function to allow access to the product held 
by another manufacturer without court intervention.142 
B. THE BIOSIMILAR PATENT DANCE 
The second case study is a more recent development, arising 
subsequent to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act in 2010.143 As part of the new abbreviated 
route to market for biosimilar biological products, the statute ap-
pears on its face to require a disclosure by the biosimilar sponsor 
to the innovator product sponsor of its application to the FDA as 
well as manufacturing information. The statute states: 
Not later than 20 days after the Secretary notifies the . . . applicant 
that the application has been accepted for review, the . . . applicant—
(A) shall provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of the applica-
tion submitted to the Secretary . . . and such other information that 
describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological 
product that is the subject of such application.144 
Following such disclosure, the statute provides for a private ex-
change between the biosimilar applicant and the reference bio-
logic sponsor that identifies patents for potential litigation.145 
The statute imposes good-faith negotiations between the two 
parties; if there is no agreement resulting from the negotiations, 
the innovator is to bring a patent infringement action against 
the biosimilar applicant.146 These provisions are known as the 
patent dance. 
In addition, the biosimilar applicant “shall provide notice to 
the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the 
date of the first commercial marketing of the biological product 
licensed under subsection (k).”147 After receiving notice of first 
commercial marketing from the biosimilar sponsor, the innova-
 
 142. S. 974, 115th Cong. § 2(B)(i)–(ii) (Apr. 27, 2017).  
 143. Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2). 
 145. See id. § 262(l)(1), (l)(3)(A) (2012). 
 146. Id. § 262(l)(4)–(6)(B). 
 147. Id. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
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tor (reference product sponsor) may seek a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent the manufacture or sale of the biosimilar product 
until all patent disputes are resolved.148 
The provisions immediately sparked controversy and made 
their way to the Supreme Court in June 2017. Amgen and 
Sandoz disputed both provisions of the statute with regard to 
Sandoz’s product Zarxio, the biosimilar version of Amgen’s 
Neupogen (filgrastim).149 The FDA accepted the biosimilar ap-
plication for Zarxio on July 7, 2014. Sandoz then notified Amgen 
that it had submitted the application and intended to commer-
cially market Zarxio immediately after FDA approval.150 How-
ever, Sandoz refused to disclose both the application and the 
manufacturing information.151 Amgen filed suit in October 2014 
in the Northern District of California, citing both state unfair-
competition law and patent infringement.152 The complaint 
asked for injunctive relief for Sandoz’s noncompliance with the 
disclosure provisions in the statute. Sandoz argued that Amgen’s 
patent was invalid and denied any violation of the statute’s dis-
closure provision. Separately, the two parties were involved in 
litigation regarding the 180-day notice of commercial marketing 
requirement.153 
The Federal Circuit addressed both issues, affirming the 
dismissal of the state unfair competition claims, declaring that 
an injunction was not available as a remedy,154 and as for the 
notice issue, holding that a biosimilar must be licensed at the 
time the applicant gives the reference sponsor the requisite 180-
day notice.155 In July 2017, the Supreme Court thus addressed 
two related questions on certiorari: (1) whether the statutory 
language instructing a biosimilar applicant to provide its appli-
cation and manufacturing information to the reference biologic 
sponsor after FDA acceptance of the application is enforceable 
 
 148. Id. § 262(l)(8)(B). 
 149. Zarxio (filgrastim-sndz) was approved by the FDA on March 6, 2015. 
Approval Package for: Application Number: 125553Orig1s000, FDA (Mar. 6, 
2015) https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2015/ 
125553Orig1s000Approv.pdf. 
 150. Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 582 U.S. __, Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195, slip. op. 
at 8 (June 12, 2017). 
 151. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C). 
 152. Sandoz, Inc., slip op. at 8; Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2015 WL 
1264756, at *7–9 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 19, 2015). 
 153. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, 
Inc., No. 3:13-cv-02904-MMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013). 
 154. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 155. Id. 
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by injunction; and (2) whether the biosimilar applicant must give 
notice of intended commercial marketing to the reference bio-
logic sponsor only after obtaining an approved license from the 
FDA.156 
The Supreme Court held that the biosimilar statute157 was 
not enforceable by injunction because Sandoz disclosed neither 
the application nor manufacturing information for the biosimilar 
to Amgen, and thus there was no “artificial infringement” trig-
gering those remedies as available in the generic drug context.158 
The Court held that the exclusive statutory remedy was an ac-
tion for declaratory judgment.159 The Court remanded to the 
Federal Circuit both the issue of whether California unfair com-
petition law provides a separate remedy160 and the issue of 
whether the BCPIA preempts state law remedies.161 
The Court also held that the statute allows a biosimilar ap-
plicant to give notice of first commercial marketing prior to ob-
taining a license from the FDA.162 The Court relied on a plain-
language statutory interpretation and structural analysis of 
other timing provisions in the statute.163 This holding provides 
a significant advantage to biosimilar applicants because they 
can enter the market much earlier. Most interesting to this sec-
ond question faced by the Court, Justice Breyer penned a brief 
concurrence harkening to judicial deference, and perhaps nudg-
ing the FDA to act: 
The Court’s interpretation of the statutory terms before us is a reason-
able interpretation, and I join its opinion. In my view, Congress implic-
itly delegated to the Food and Drug Administration authority to inter-
pret those same terms. That being so, if that agency, after greater 
experience administering this statute, determines that a different in-
terpretation would better serve the statute’s objectives, it may well 
have authority to depart from, or to modify, today’s interpretation, 
though we need not now decide any such matter.164 
This is not the end of the story. Much confusion remains as 
to the application of the Supreme Court’s holding on both points 
and whether the FDA will step in and make policy choices to fill 
 
 156. Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 582 U.S. __, Nos. 15-1039, 15-1195, slip op. 
(June 12, 2017). 
 157. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
 158. Sandoz, Inc., slip op. at 10–13. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4). 
 159. Sandoz, Inc., slip op. at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C)). 
 160. Id. at 14. 
 161. Id. at 15. 
 162. Id. at 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)A)). 
 163. Id. at 16. 
 164. Id. at 19 (Breyer, J. concurring) (citation omitted). 
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in some of the details. The lower courts will be reviewing cases 
on BPCIA-related issues for the foreseeable future. For example, 
the Federal Circuit reviewed a dispute between Amgen and Hos-
pira in August 2017, where Amgen sought to compel discovery 
from Hospira of manufacturing information for their biosimilar 
version of the innovator biologic Epogen. Hospira had filed their 
biosimilar application with the FDA in December 2014, provided 
a copy of the application to Amgen, yet did not separately provide 
information regarding “the process . . . used to manufacture the 
biological product” as the statute requires.165 The Federal Cir-
cuit denied Amgen’s requests, citing a lack of jurisdiction166 and 
general concepts of civil procedure.167 
Similarly, in Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., filed in October 
2017, Genentech asserted patent infringement and sought a de-
claratory judgment for Amgen’s refusal to provide manufactur-
ing information independent of the limited information provided 
in the application itself.168 The litigation involved Amgen’s 
Mvasi, the biosimilar to Genentech’s lucrative innovator anti-
cancer therapy Avastin (bevacizumab).169 Amgen continued to 
refuse this manufacturing information as an additional submis-
sion to Genentech, arguing the statute does not require it. This 
is an interesting position, given that Amgen sued for a similar 
refusal as the innovator in the previous case. Genentech notes 
this seemingly contradictory position in this case and chastises 
the actions in “stonewalling” as “particularly brazen.”170 The fact 
that companies are altering their interpretations of the statute 
depending on their financial stake and position as either the in-
novator or biosimilar product sponsor should be a clear signal 
that clarity is needed to rectify the ambiguity. 
As for the fate of the questions remanded by the Supreme 
Court, a unanimous Federal Circuit ruling on December 14, 2017 
held that Congress “fully occupied” the field of patent litigation 
for biosimilars with passage of the BPCIA.171 This federal 
 
 165. Amgen, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 866 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 166. Id. at 1363. 
 167. Id. at 1361. 
 168. Complaint at 5–10, Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01471-
GMS (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2017).  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 5. 
 171. Amgen, Inc., Amgen Mfg. Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). 
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preemption holding means that state laws cannot compel disclo-
sure of manufacturing information.172 Accordingly, going for-
ward, pioneer biologic companies have neither federal injunc-
tions nor state laws to turn to when a biosimilar sponsor refuses 
to provide this information. Patent infringement actions remain 
available. 
IV.  TOWARD MEANINGFUL FDA ACTION: INITIAL 
MUSINGS   
The widespread uncertainty resulting from the two case 
studies generates several implications that may prove damaging 
for access and innovation, as well as patient safety. These in-
clude hefty litigation costs as courts continue to wrestle with the 
case law and statute. Despite the Supreme Court decision in 
Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. and the Federal Circuit’s decision 
regarding federal preemption in the context of the BPCIA, for 
example, procedural questions resulting from the legislation 
promise future litigation. Likewise, litigation is pending on var-
ying aspects of the REMS statutory provisions. Given industry 
uncertainty about the law, generic and biosimilar sponsors may 
decide to delay development until there is more resolution, or 
abandon development efforts entirely. There may be a direct im-
pact on drug costs, as the longer an innovator product enjoys the 
totality of the market, the higher the overall costs for that drug 
or biologic will be for consumers. In fact, one study published in 
July 2014 estimated that approximately $5.4 billion per year has 
been lost in prescription-drug savings due to distribution re-
strictions imposed by brand manufacturers under the auspices 
of REMS.173 Last, and perhaps most troubling, is that industry 
behavior using REMS to block competitor uses may also be det-
rimental to the long-term safety of users. Physicians have al-
ready identified refusing access to products for bioequivalence 
studies and the blocking of REMS through patents as a direct 
threat to patient safety.174 
However, where FDA authority interacts with patent pro-
tections, the FDA has been historically reluctant to take actions 
that may be viewed as aggressive, or outside their expertise 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOB. ADVISORS, LOST PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAV-
INGS FROM USE OF REMS PROGRAMS TO DELAY GENERIC MARKET ENTRY 1 (July 
2014), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/REMS_Studyfinal_July2014.pdf.  
 174. See, e.g., Ameet Sarpawatri et al., Using a Drug Safety Tool To Prevent 
Competition, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1476 (2014). 
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reading product safety and efficacy.175 Some commentators as-
sert that the FDA has no authority to act in particular situa-
tions, including biologic patent disputes.176 However, undenia-
bly, the FDA is now considering best practices in each of these 
areas and Commissioner Gottlieb has prioritized issues impact-
ing competition. Public meetings and continued communications 
with industry reflect real concern with the problems. The cur-
rent momentum within the FDA may be shifting the longstand-
ing hands-off approach to issues connected to patent protections. 
Complicating things is the fact that both the REMS and bi-
osimilar case studies raise jurisdictional questions. As discussed 
above, the FDA is a single agency, with a product-safety mission, 
as well as a mission to speed innovations. The FDA is universally 
looked upon as the stalwart agency shaping drug and biologic 
law and policy. However, the PTO and FTC play a large role in 
restricting and guiding the behavior of the drug and biologic in-
dustry. Often it appears that the FDA defers to these agencies 
on particular issues despite the agency’s broad authority. This is 
problematic given the roles of the PTO and FTC. The PTO acts 
to reward innovation with patent exclusivities at the outset of 
invention. Their statutory role includes granting good patents 
that satisfy the core statutory requirements of novelty, utility, 
nonobviousness, and enablement, including patentable subject 
matter. The PTO also plays an active role in assessments of is-
sued patents through newly created post-grant review challenge 
procedures.177 These mechanisms may in a given scenario be 
well-suited to challenge a potentially invalid or unenforceable 
individual ETASU REMS, yet they do not provide industry-wide 
certainty and resolution. 
The FTC monitors industry behavior once on the market, 
assuring that companies do not violate statutes such as the Sher-
man Act178 and the Lanham Act179 that prohibit various forms 
 
 175. Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 90, at 211. 
 176. “Unlike the Hatch Waxman Act, pursuant to which the FDA plays at 
least some ministerial role in publishing Orange Book patents, the FDA is 
wholly without power to address biologic patent disputes.” Michael A. Carrier & 
Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 ILL. L. REV. 1, 
43 (2018). 
 177. Post Grant Review, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www 
.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post 
-grant-review (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 179. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). 
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of anticompetitive activity. The FTC has routinely exercised this 
function in the drug and biologic realm, most notably with pay-
for-delay settlements. But this reactive watchdogging occurs af-
ter a product has entered the market and is not best situated to 
proactively address the structural problems that foster the ac-
tivity in the first place. Recent legal-media analysis notes that 
the FDA’s increasing focus on problems with competition in the 
pharmaceutical realm may be “paving the way for the [FTC] to 
bring more novel enforcement actions.”180 An expert within the 
FTC’s healthcare unit describes this recent FDA activity ad-
dressing competition as “an elevation of these issues to the high-
est levels of the FDA.”181 
The FDA, on the other hand, has immense latitude to say 
what the statutory provisions mean for industry as part of the 
review and approval process, and provide direction to industry 
prior to entering the market. In a sense, by not acting in these 
two situations the FDA is in fact violating both of its core mis-
sions: to protect the public safety and speed innovation. As noted 
above, the FDA has rejected citizen’s petitions urging that the 
agency take action to formulate clear rules for the single, shared 
REMS systems. The FDA has issued guidance on various aspects 
of REMS,182 though they have not addressed the significant 
problems discussed earlier in a meaningful way through regula-
tions or clear guidance. The FDA has also expressed that they 
would exercise enforcement discretion by not penalizing innova-
tors for providing samples for bioequivalance studies where dis-
tribution restrictions via ETASU were in place.183 This, as in 
Heckler v. Chaney, is an example of an agency merely declining 
to take enforcement action where the statute imposes civil pen-
alties for violations of shared REMS systems, well within the 
“committed to agency discretion by law” language in the APA. 
Yet it provides no direction to guide industry behavior. 
With regard to the biosimilar patent provisions, Justice 
Breyer himself explicitly nudged the FDA to take their role in 
interpreting the statute to heart. Justice Breyer states that the 
agency could act to interpret the statutory terms (e.g., regarding 
 
 180. Melissa Lipman, FDA’s Focus on Competition May Boost FTC Enforce-
ment, LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/990139/fda-s 
-focus-on-competition-may-boost-ftc-enforcement. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Use of a Drug Master File, supra note 109. 
 183. Complaint at 12, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014). 
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the timing of the 180-day first commercial marketing notice). 
This could be done through notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
provide the needed clarity and process. It would be time consum-
ing, and would be certain to be subject to legal challenge, and 
then subject to judicial deference as Justice Breyer offers in his 
concurrence. Perhaps these two case studies illustrate agency 
restraint at its finest, or agency reluctance at its worst. Patients, 
and innovation, deserve concerted attention at the FDA going 
forward as to how agency action could best be calibrated to rem-
edy these problems. 
